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The “slippery slope” framework assumes that economic determinants of tax behavior 
represent authorities’ power, which leads to enforced tax compliance. On the other hand, 
psychological determinants lead to trust in authorities and also to voluntary tax compliance. 
This research work aims to assess the perception of Portuguese and Swiss individual 
taxpayers in relation to various aspects of their relationship with tax authorities and the 
respective impact on tax evasion. The data set was obtained from two surveys applied during 
2019, one applied to Portuguese taxpayers and another to Swiss taxpayers, that filed personal 
tax returns at least once during the previous five fiscal years. The sample consists of 179 
questionnaires. Eight dimensions were identified: tax evasion, voluntary tax compliance, 
enforced tax compliance, trust; legitimate power; coercive power; power and legitimacy. 
The empirical work was carried out through a series of tests of mean differences (t test) and 
multiple comparisons (Scheffé test) for the investigation of significant differences. It was 
found that trust presented the greatest number of significant differences, taking into account 
the control variables sex, age, country, tax return submission, tax education, conjugality, 
Current Feeling of Belonging to a Religion (CFBR), religion and degree of comfort with the 
income (DCI). In relation to these, country was the control variable that most contributed to 
the differences in means, in relation to certain tax matters. 
We also estimated an econometric model for tax evasion. We found that voluntary tax 
compliance, trust and legitimate power, are statistically significant and negatively correlated 
with tax evasion. In addition, we also found that there is a positive and statistically significant 
correlation between tax evasion and the dimensions enforced tax compliance and coercive 
power. 
 
JEL Classification: H20, H24 and H26. 





O conceito de "slippery slope" pressupõe que os determinantes económicos do 
comportamento fiscal representem o poder das autoridades, o que por sua vez leva ao 
cumprimento fiscal coercivo. Por outro lado, os determinantes psicológicos levam à 
confiança nas autoridades e também ao cumprimento fiscal voluntário. Este trabalho de 
pesquisa tem como objetivo avaliar a percepção de contribuintes individuais portugueses e 
suíços em relação a vários aspectos de seu relacionamento com as autoridades fiscais e o 
respectivo impacto na evasão fiscal. O conjunto de dados foi obtido de duas pesquisas 
aplicadas em 2019, uma aplicada a contribuintes portugueses e outra a contribuintes suíços, 
que apresentaram declarações de impostos pessoais pelo menos uma vez nos cinco exercícios 
fiscais anteriores. A amostra é composta por 179 questionários. Foram identificadas oito 
dimensões: incumprimento fiscal, cumprimento fiscal voluntário, cumprimento fiscal 
coercivo, confiança; poder legítimo; poder coercivo; poder e legitimidade. 
O trabalho empírico foi realizado através de uma série de testes de diferenças médias (teste 
T) e comparações múltiplas (teste de Scheffé) para a investigação de diferenças 
estatisticamente significativas. Constatou-se que a confiança apresentou o maior número de 
diferenças significativas, considerando as variáveis de controlo: sexo, idade, país, submissão 
de declaração fiscal, educação tributária, conjugalidade, Sentimento Atual de Pertença a uma 
Religião (CFBR), religião e grau de conforto com a renda (DCI). Em relação a estes, país foi 
a variável de controle que mais contribuiu para as diferenças de médias em relação a certas 
questões tributárias. 
Também estimamos um modelo econométrico para o incumprimento fiscal. Constatamos que 
o cumprimento fiscal voluntário, a confiança e o poder legítimo são estatisticamente 
significativos e correlacionados negativamente com o incumprimento fiscal. Além disso, 
também descobrimos que existe uma correlação positiva e estatisticamente significativa entre 
o incuprimento discal e as dimensões do cumprimento fiscal coercivo e do poder coercivo. 
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Countries use taxes for financing public services and goods. Taxpayers perceive taxes as a 
burden and are usually sceptical about how governments manage and spend their taxes and 
often hold negative attitudes towards taxpaying (Hofmann et al., 2008; Benk & Budak, 
2011). This scepticism is increased when there is a common belief that corruption is spread 
across government institutions. Furthermore, during periods of fiscal imbalances where there 
is an increased pressure to reduce public debt, most governments take measures to increase 
tax collection.  Taxpayers may be reluctant to comply under pressure of tight personal and 
domestic budgets. Consequently, tax revenues diminish due to noncompliance and often 
governments rely on increased tax rates to make up for such loss.  
Tax authorities influence taxpayer’s behaviour to comply with tax law through displaying 
power and/or establishing a trust relationship. Therefore, it is crucial to understand what 
influences taxpayers’ attitudes towards tax compliance. Trust, perceptions of fairness and 
corruption have consistently been identified as playing a crucial role in tax compliance 
(Torgler, 2003, 2004; Wenzel, 2003; Sonnur et al., 2019). Where governments are seen to be 
fair, not corrupt and treat citizens with respect, taxpayers are likely to trust them and show 
more willingness to comply and honestly pay their fair share in taxes (Feld & Frey, 2007). 
Concurrently, power displayed by authorities has also been identified as a main contributor 
to compliance namely the sanctions used to enforce tax compliance.  
According to the Slippery Slope Framework (SSF) (Kirchler, 2007; Kirchler & Wahl, 2010; 
Muehlbacher & Kirchler, 2010) the effectiveness of economic and non-economic factors 
depends on the relationship between taxpayers and tax authorities. In a trustful climate, trust-
building measures may be more important than in a relationship that is based primarily on 
the power of authorities, where deterrence may be the right policy (Muehlbacher et al., 2011). 
In the SSF, two different forms of tax compliance are assumed: (i) voluntary tax compliance 
and (ii) enforced tax compliance (Kirchler, 2007). 
Based on these definitions, we test the relationship between tax evasion and enforced tax 
compliance, voluntary tax compliance, trust, legitimate power and coercive power in 
Portugal and Switzerland. Switzerland has been chosen by two main reasons, first, the central 
government takes a low share of total tax revenues when compared to other OECD countries, 
2 
 
(e.g., in 2018, 27.9 percent, OECD average countries, 34.3 percent). Secondly, Switzerland 
had the lowest average size, 7.2 percent of GDP of shadow economy1 from a set of 158 
countries over the period 1991 to 2015 (e.g., the average of the 158 countries was 31.9 percent 
of GDP while in Portugal was 21.9 percent of GDP (Medina & Schneider, 2018). 
This research work aims to assess the perception of Portuguese and Swiss individual 
taxpayers in relation to various aspects of their relationship with tax authorities and the 
respective impact on tax evasion, as well as to ascertain whether there are statistically 
significant differences in the scope of sociodemographic variables as well as religion. It is 
important to note that there are several relationships that can be tested, tax evasion, our 
dependent variable. The independent variables will be the dimensions defined for the study 
of the interaction between taxpayers and tax authorities (voluntary tax compliance, enforced 
tax compliance, trust; legitimate power; coercive power; power and legitimacy). The primary 
research question is “What are the determinant dimensions in tax evasion?”. 
In addition, we considered secondary research questions based on nine control variables 
(sociodemographic and religion) which are widely used by other authors (McKerchar, 2003; 
Torgler, 2007; Devos, 2014). The secondary research question is “Which control variable(s) 
lead to statistically significant differences in relation to the defined dimensions”. 
In order to test the main hypotheses, the data set was obtained through questionnaire survey. 
This survey was based on questions (indicators) previously elaborated and tested by other 
authors in other countries. The questionnaire form was derived from (Kastlunger et al., 2013) 
study with Italian taxpayers. The questionnaire was applied to individuals tax residents in 
Portugal that had submitted at least once a tax return in Portugal for personal income tax 
purposes during the last five previous fiscal years, the same principle was applied for 
Switzerland. The questionnaire was made available online using the google forms platform 
and was shared across multiple social media platforms. The questionnaire was administered 
in 2019. 
 
1 The shadow economy includes all economic activities which are hidden from official authorities for monetary, 
regulatory, and institutional reasons. Monetary reasons include avoiding paying taxes and all social security 
contributions, regulatory reasons include avoiding governmental bureaucracy or the burden of regulatory 




We conducted two quantitative surveys, Switzerland (N = 97) and Portugal (N = 82). The 
results obtained point to country as the variable with more dimensions that have statistically 
significant differences in means (7 out of 8). Thus, the differences between Swiss and 
Portuguese taxpayers in relation to certain matters of a tax nature were remarkable. 
We also estimated an econometric model for tax evasion. We found that voluntary tax 
compliance, trust and legitimate power, are statistically significant and negatively correlated 
with tax evasion. In addition, we also found that there is a positive and statistically significant 
correlation between tax evasion and the dimensions enforced tax compliance and coercive 
power. 
2 Literature Review 
2.1 Tax compliance 
One of the first approaches to the concept of tax compliance is that tax compliance is verified 
when taxpayers timely declare income earned and expenses incurred in a timely manner so 
that the income tax settlement amount is accurate, respecting the tax rules in force and the 
prevailing jurisprudence at each moment in time (Roth et al., 1989). (Devos, 2014) completes 
this definition by introducing the definition of tax non-compliance (which does not include 
tax planning situations (legal tax invoice reduction within the terms of the law) or tax 
avoidance (when tax invoice reduction is performed through use of loopholes which can 
create ambiguity in the tax law). The author understands that tax non-compliance includes 
situations of excess of deductible expenses in tax reporting or even of underreporting earned 
income. The latter may occur intentionally - a sanctioned situation - or involuntarily, for lack 
of information, lack of understanding of the applicable tax law, negligence, among other 
reasons.  
The topic of tax (non) compliance was also studied from a macro perspective, using the tax 
gap2 concept by (James & Alley 1999; 2002). This definition was also used in the works of 
(Devos, 2005; 2014; Kirchler, 2007; Kirchler & Wahl, 2010), among others. Still, there is no 
definition of tax compliance that is unanimously accepted by all researchers due to the 
 
2 It is the difference between the amount of tax that should have been legally paid by taxpayers and the 
amount of tax collected by the tax authorities (Mazur & Plumley, 2007 and McManus & Warren, 2007). 
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diversity of their background and the diverse scope of their work Devos (2005; 2014), Diogo 
(2018). 
The OECD also has its own definition of tax compliance, according to which tax compliance 
consists of cumulatively fulfilling the following conditions: 1) being duly registered with the 
tax authorities; 2) submit the income statements in a timely manner; 3) declare the correct 
amounts of income and expenses and 4) pay the taxes due within the stipulated deadlines. It 
is understood that if one of these conditions is not met, the taxpayer will be in a non-compliant 
scenario. 
2.2 Major trends related to Tax Compliance  
There are two major trends in the field of study of tax compliance or tax avoidance/tax 
evasion. The first trend is associated with models based on economic theory. The models 
based on economic theory assume that taxpayers are rational and aim to maximize their 
expected utility by guiding their strategic decisions with this goal in mind. If the probability 
of detection or audit is not too high and the fines or penalties are not too severe, taxpayers 
will tend to under-report income and / or over-declare expenses, thus entering intentionally 
in tax non-compliance. The same is to say that intentional tax non-compliance will occur in 
situations where the respective benefits exceed the costs (Becker, 1968).  
The second trend for the study of tax compliance and / or tax evasion and fraud is associated 
with models of social and tax psychology whose pioneering work was (Schmölders, 1959).  
Furthermore, other authors reinforced the relevance of behavioural aspects to the study of the 
theme in question (Pickhardt & Prinz, 2014). From their perspective, tax (non) compliance, 
is a process in which individuals relate directly or indirectly to each other. 
With tax payments being a duty of all citizens, tax authorities have the primary function of 
ensuring that taxpayers pay taxes due to meet the state's financial needs and for a fair 
redistribution of income and wealth. Tax authorities will safeguard tax compliance in two 
ways: (i) taxpayers voluntarily pay their taxes because they understand that it is their moral 
duty or (ii) taxpayers pay their taxes because they are obliged through enforced power of the 
tax authorities (Braithwaite, 2003 and Kogler et al., 2013). The first situation corresponds to 
voluntary tax compliance and the second to enforced tax compliance (Kogler et al., 2013).  
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Considering models based on economic theory and models of social and tax psychology for 
the study of tax compliance, tax authorities may apply measures based on both economic and 
psychosociological factors. 
2.3 The tax game and the interaction between taxpayers and tax authorities 
From (Pickhardt & Prinz, 2014) perspective, tax (non) compliance, as well as tax evasion, 
are processes in which individuals relate, directly or indirectly, to each other. The authors 
present the “tax game” identifying the various players: taxpayers, tax legislators (law 
makers), tax practitioners (accountants) and tax authorities. The authors imply that there can 
exist four types of subgames within the tax game. Taxpayers vs Tax Authorities – one of the 
subgames is considered to be the most important game, the authors highlight three aspects: 
power, the level of service provided and trust. The power is linked to the of an audit and 
detection of evidence of tax evasion / fraud and the fines imposed for such behaviour. The 
level of service provided refers to taxpayer assistance with regard to tax information (doubts 
/ aid in interpreting tax law and other services available). In turn, trust, together with the two 
aspects mentioned earlier, is crucial for assessing the degree of cooperation between 
taxpayers and the tax authorities. 
2.4 Paradigms on the interaction between taxpayers and tax authorities 
Tax non-compliance is operationalized in two major forms: income under-declaration (e.g. 
sales suppression) and over-declaration of expenses (e.g. false invoices or inclusion of 
ineligible personal expenses, in countries where such expenses allow deductions or rebates) 
(OECD, 2017). These two forms of tax non-compliance are detrimental to the public accounts 
of any country and contribute to widening the tax gap. Reducing the tax gap by promoting 
tax compliance in order to ensure a fair distribution of income and tax effort becomes a 
preferable approach than: 1) increasing the tax burden; 2) the reduction of public expenditure 
and 3) the conditioning of the quality of public services and social benefits provided by the 
State (Devos, 2014 and Governo de Portugal, 2018). The relationship between taxpayers and 
tax authorities - one of the tax games identified by (Pickhardt & Prinz, 2014) - is a function 
of the perception of the other party's objectives and strategies (Kirchler, 2007 and Alm et al., 
2010), and three paradigms are proposed to study this relationship: 1) “cops and robbers” and 
2) service providers and clients and 3) trust. The first involves maximizing the utility 
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expected by taxpayers, while tax authorities will execute strategies acting as "cops" to catch 
the "robbers", in this scenario there is no cooperation between taxpayers and the tax 
authorities. The second, in turn, assumes the promotion of voluntary tax compliance and 
cooperation between taxpayers and the tax authorities through relationship model in which 
taxpayers are treated as clients, providing them with a certain level of service. There is also 
the suggestion of a third paradigm, that of trust (Alm et al., 2010; Alm & Torgler, 2011; Alm, 
2012). Nothing precludes the coexistence of these approaches at the same time in a given tax 
jurisdiction, especially if we consider that there are multiple types of taxpayers. 
2.4.1. Cops and Robbers 
This paradigm postulates that tax authorities act as “cops” and view taxpayers as potential 
offenders’ "robbers" and is somehow aligned with economic deterrence models. Tax non-
compliance will thus be curbed by resorting to tax audits and by the imposition of fines and 
penalties (Alm et al., 2010; Allingham & Sandmo, 1972; Srinivasan, 1973; Yitzhaki, 1974; 
Kirchler, 2007 and Diogo, 2018).  
Assuming that taxpayers are rational human beings and maximize their expected utility, if 
taxpayers feel indicted as potential defaulters, they can in fact take that stance and lower the 
amount of taxes payable through recourse to tax loopholes or risk if the benefits of tax default 
outweigh the associated costs (Kirchler, 2007).  
Tax authorities will resource to various methods in their fight against tax evasion and fraud, 
highlighting the audits and enforcement of the respective penalties (Kirchler, 2007). In order 
to carry out tax audits it is necessary to take into account that these generate administrative 
costs (Collins & Plumlee, 1991).  
The task of promoting voluntary tax compliance is arduous due to the range of opportunities 
that economic globalization and e-commerce provide for tax evasion and fraud which is one 
of the main causes of tax non-compliance (Kirchler, 2007). Tax authorities have to ensure 
that taxes are received by implementing strategies and policies that impact on a country's 
economy through the tax compliance decisions of economic agents. The Swiss taxpayers 
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rank as second worst payers3 on the European continent, just behind Greece. Tax claims4 are 
cited as the main reason for late payments in Switzerland. 
The management style of tax authorities is often traditional and focused on command and 
control, with automatic fines and penalties on non-compliant taxpayers (Kirchler, 2007). 
However, automatisms may create situations of overzealous or improper and inappropriate 
punishment (James & Alley, 2002 and Payne, 1993). In addition, (Braithwaite 2003) notes 
that tax authorities’ power is not always used efficiently, which ultimately affects the 
relationship between tax authorities and taxpayers. This is reflected in a climate of distrust 
and a lower willingness for voluntary tax compliance.  
Ultimately, the interaction between taxpayers and tax authorities will depend on tax 
authorities' dominant perception of taxpayers. That is, if taxpayers are mostly perceived as 
potential defaulters or as potential customers, as well as the style resulting from this 
perception, that is, if they adopt a style of a “cop” or of a “service provider” (Kirchler, 2007). 
The style used by tax authorities is important, as it is this that determines the level of tax 
morale and voluntary tax compliance by taxpayers (Kirchler, 2007). 
2.4.2.  Service provider and customer 
The purpose of tax collection is to ultimately achieve a fair distribution of income and wealth 
as well as to meet the financial needs of the State (and other public entities). (James & Alley, 
2002) argue that in order to ensure the proper functioning of the tax system, tax authorities 
should reconsider their approach towards taxpayers, moving from a style of command and 
control to a style of responsive regulation. The style of responsive regulation is based in the 
theory of regulation. This theory implies that regulation exists for the purpose of benefiting 
those who are regulated5 (Stigler, 1971 and Pelzman, 1976).  
 
3 https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/withholding-tax_switzerland-likes-to-tax-differently-from-europe/44591156  
4 Since January 1, 2019, Switzerland is the only country in Europe where employees’ taxes are not deducted 
directly from their wages. 
5 Aside from the unique feature that the Confederation, the cantons and the communes all levy taxes, the 
Swiss tax system also sets itself apart by letting citizens decide for themselves which taxes may be levied on 
them. This is because the state can impose only those obligations on them – including taxes – that are 
provided for in the Constitution and laws, and constitutional amendments automatically have to be subject to 
a popular vote (mandatory referendum) at both the federal and cantonal level. 
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By reconsidering their approach style, tax authorities treat taxpayers as clients, taking their 
needs into account in order to promote voluntary tax compliance. In this regard tax 
authorities’ officials do have a pivotal role in achieving a high level of tax compliance 
(Kirchler, 2007 and Alm et al., 2010). The officials act as intermediary agents for tax 
compliance, dissuading their clients (the taxpayers) from any problems with the tax 
authorities. Tax authorities’ officials should have communication skills, a high level of tax 
literacy and consistency in advice and the application of fines and / or penalties to non-
complying taxpayers (Hansford & Hasseldine, 2002). Therefore, the level of taxpayers' 
cooperation with the tax authorities will depend on their rules and / or regulations (Kirchler, 
2007). This paradigm on the interaction between tax authorities and taxpayers aims to design 
a relationship based on trust, empathy and other values  (e.g. communication and reputation) 
with a view of achieving a high level of voluntary tax compliance. 
In the Swiss case, the FTA is keen to maintain close contact with its customers and sees itself 
as the partner of Swiss taxpayers. It takes a responsible approach to the resources of taxpayers 
and staff alike and seeks to minimise the administrative costs not only for taxpayers 
themselves but also for the staff of the FTA. The electronic processing of tax transactions 
has been expanded in phases to deliver shorter processing times for tax dossiers. As well as 
moving away from paper and conventional mail, printed and electronic forms of 
communication are being linked. FTA publications now have a code that gives the user direct 
access to the document on the FTA website (Swiss Confederation, 2017). 
As the Portuguese taxpayer's standard is of voluntary compliance, the tax authorities’ focus, 
on simplifying compliance, supporting the compliance for those who, wishing to comply, 
have difficulties to comply, and to punish those who deliberately do not want to comply. To 
improve the relationship with taxpayers several initiatives were made, in particular in 
simplifying tax compliance, e.g the submission of (IRS) declarations are now made 
exclusively by electronic means, the scope of taxpayers to whom the “Automatic IRS” is 
available has also been extended, the introduction of direct debit payment mechanisms, the 
introduction of the first phase of the “Automatic VAT” project and also the implementation 
of the “E-Tax Free” (Government of Portugal, 2018). 
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In both jurisdictions the approach will then be to treat all taxpayers as clients. However, the 
actual success of the tax authorities or other state organizations will depend on their 
legitimacy (Easton, 1965; Karakus, 2017 and Robins & Kiser, 2017) and the level of 
procedural justice (Gobena & Dijke, 2017; Murphy, Bradford & Jackson, 2016 and Murphy, 
Tyler & Curtis, 2009).  
Legitimacy consists in the belief that the authorities are able to abide by the rules imposed 
by them (French & Raven, 1959). Perception of legitimacy is important for fostering law 
enforcement and promoting cooperation between institutions and citizens and encouraging 
reporting of practices that go against the spirit of the law (Jackson et al., 2012; Karakus, 
2017; Murphy & Cherney, 2012; Murphy, Tyler & Curtis, 2009; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; 
Tyler, 1997, 2006; Tyler, Schulhofe & Huq, 2010). 
Procedural justice means that taxpayers comply with their tax obligations even if the 
likelihood of being found to be non-compliant is low or very low (Murphy & Jackson, 2016). 
If the authorities treat citizens fairly, with dignity, respect and if they “listen” to citizens by 
acting neutrally in their decisions, they promote a policy of encouraging compliance (Tyler, 
2006 and Murphy, 2004). 
2.5 Trust 
The concept of trust can be divided into two types: 1) reason-based trust (also called 
calculated, rational or knowledge-based trust) and 2) implicit trust (also called identification-
based trust, habitual trust, social trust or affective trust). The first type of trust arises as a 
result of a deliberate rational decision of the trustor based on four factors: 1) objectives to be 
achieved; 2) degree of dependence; 3) internal factors and 4) external factors. The second 
type is defined as an automatic, involuntary and unconscious reaction to a stimulus 
(Castelfranchi & Falcone, 2010 and Gangl, Hofmann & Kirchler, 2015). These two types of 
trust are related, either in parallel or sequentially (Evans, 2008). 
In general, evidence shows that trust in tax authorities is positively correlated with tax 
payments (Hammar et al., 2009; Torgler, 2003). Trust in authorities exists if taxpayers 
perceive authorities’ treatment as respectful, fair and transparent (Kirchler, 2007; Kirchler et 
al., 2008). Additional findings of (Feld & Frey 2002, 2007) show that trust in authorities and 
perceived treatment by tax authorities positively influences the relationship between 
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authorities and taxpayers, thus enhancing tax compliance levels. As a result, we formulate 
the following hypothesis: 
In this regard, a study conducted in Switzerland which aimed to examine whether the 
relationship between tax authorities and taxpayers influenced the level of tax compliance and 
tax morale. Results concluded that in the cantons where citizens’ participation rights are 
higher, the tax authorities have a more respectful and less suspicious outlook on taxpayers 
who report lower incomes. Accordingly, the willingness to comply with tax authorities is 
related to the degree of satisfaction with public services. An intrinsic motivation to pay taxes 
(“tax morale”) has been advanced as a possible explanation for high rates of compliance 
(Torgler, 2002; Wenzel, 2003). In this scenario, citizens pay taxes out of a sense of social 
responsibility and respect for the law. When taxpayers are treated as trustworthy, they 
reciprocate by way of compliance (Feld & Frey, 2002). Similarly, attitudes towards taxation 
and politics can be seen as determinants of trust and perceived fairness of the tax burden and 
measures applied by the authorities are determinants of trust and crucial determinants of tax 
compliance (Kirchler, Kogler & Muehlbacher, 2014). Furthermore, when authorities display 
accountability, transparency and low corruption levels, taxpayers perceive them as 
trustworthy. Trust in tax authorities thus appears to foster tax compliance and is positively 
related to tax compliance (e.g., Torgler, 2003). In the SSF (Kirchler, 2007; Kirchler et al., 
2008), trust stimulates a synergistic interaction climate, in which taxpayers and authorities 
interact in a respectful manner and taxpayers voluntary cooperate with authorities. 
2.6 Power  
Power can be defined as the potential and perceived ability of one party to influence another's 
behaviour (Gangl, Hofmann & Kirchler, 2015). The power of the tax authorities is linked, on  
one hand, to tax law and the funding it obtains from the state budget for the exercise of its 
functions and, on the other hand, to the information it provides, for example through the data 
it provides about defaulting tax payers (Kirchler, Hoelzl & Wahl, 2008). 
There are two fundamental theories about the exercise of power: enforced power as 
conceived in the work of (Becker, 1968), which points to the control of citizens and their 
punishment as tools for shaping their behaviour towards authorities' goals and legitimate 
power concept based on the works of (Turner, 2005) and (Tyler, 2006), in which authorities 
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are “accepted” by citizens (through information provided, charisma, legitimacy and level of 
experience), arguing their advocates that is a more effective and appropriate way to influence 
and shape the behaviour of individuals (Gangl, Hofmann & Kirchler, 2015). These authors 
also point out that legitimate power and enforced power are independent, since the latter may 
exist without the presence of legitimate power and vice versa, just as enforced power may 
coexist with legitimate power (Hofmann et al, 2014). (Hofmann et al., 2014) study these two 
types of power, as well as their individual and joint impact on tax compliance, finding that if 
enforced power is applied in conjunction with legitimate power, the latter is the one that has 
a relevant impact on voluntary tax compliance. Furthermore, corroborating (Tyler, 2006), the 
authors conclude that legitimate power will have more relevance than enforced power. 
Based on the studies by (Kogler et al., 2013) and (Wahl et al., 2010 and Gangl, Hofmann & 
Kirchler 2015) also conclude that the variables power and trust are not independent in the 
study of tax compliance. However, they emphasize the relevance of their interaction, adding 
that it will depend on the types of trust and power.  
2.7 The “slippery slope” framework (SSF) 
The concept of slippery slope was firstly introduced by Henk Elffers at a conference in 
Leiden (The Netherlands), “Managing and Maintaining Tax Compliance”, in 2006 (Kirchler, 
Hoelzl & Wahl, 2008). The concept of the SSF assumes that tax compliance can be achieved 
by two means: 1) economic deterrent measures, such as tax audits and fines / penalties, and 
2) fostering a trust-based relationship with providing assistance to taxpayers. promote 
voluntary tax compliance (Prinz et al., 2014). The first is associated with the "cops and 
robbers" paradigm, with greater social distance, greater (coercive) power exercised by the 
tax authorities, and the predominant type of tax compliance being enforced, as the taxpayer’s 
cooperation is achieved by threatening to apply punishment to non-compliant taxpayers. The 
second, the synergistic environment, is associated with the service provider and client 
paradigm, where there is a greater social approximation between taxpayers and tax 
authorities, as well as a higher level of trust between both parties, predominating voluntary 
tax compliance, the tax authorities exercises greater legitimate and non-enforced power, 
leading taxpayers to recognize the competence and role of the tax authorities by cooperating 
voluntarily with it (Tyler, 2006). 
12 
 
The level and type of tax compliance will depend on tax authorities’ power levels: enforced 
tax compliance with increasing tax authorities’ power and voluntary tax cooperation with 
increasing authorities trust (Kirchler, Hoelzl & Wahl., 2008). Following the reasoning, 
(Kirchler, Hoelzl & Wahl., 2008) assume that the impact of changing the level of one variable 
will depend on the level of the other variable. It is also assumed that the variables power and 
trust regulate each other, that is, the impact of increasing the tax authorities’ level of trust 
will be greater for lower levels of tax power. Similarly, the impact of increasing tax 
authorities’ level of power will be greater for lower trust levels. The SSF is shown in Figure 
I below. 
 
Figure 1 SSF graphical representation 
(Source: Kirchler, Hoelzl & Wahl, 2008) 
Figure 1 may be interpreted with points A to D below: 
A. The level of trust in the tax authorities is low, so is its level of power. In this scenario, 
taxpayers will try to maximize their expected utility by resorting to tax defaults, the level of 
tax compliance is therefore reduced; 
B. Starting from A and if the level of trust in the tax authorities remains low, if the tax 
authorities increases its level of power through greater use of tax audits and severe penalties 
in case of non-compliance, taxpayers will have fewer viable opportunities for non-tax 
compliance and thus tax compliance will be of the enforced type. Point B can be related to 
the “cops and robbers” paradigm; 
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C. Starting from A and if the tax authorities’ power level remains low, when gradually 
increasing the level of trust in tax authorities, taxpayers will tend to cooperate voluntarily 
with tax authorities. Point C can be related to the “Service provider and customer” paradigm; 
D. Represents the maximum level of tax compliance that can be achieved with high levels of 
tax authorities’ power and trust in it.  
In conclusion, the power of and trust in tax authorities will determine the type of interaction 
environment between tax authorities and taxpayers (Gangl et al., 2013; 2015). 
2.8 Empirical Studies related to the SSF 
The relationship between power and enforced compliance and between trust and voluntary 
cooperation and some of the previously mentioned assumptions of the SSF are partially 
supported by empirical tests. These assumptions received empirical support through 
experiments conducted with taxpayers showing that high in contrast to low legitimate power 
leads to a perceived service climate and voluntary cooperation (Hofmann et al. 2014).  
An Austrian sample of self-employed taxpayers (Kogler et al., 2011; Muehlbacher & 
Kirchler., 2010) showed that if taxpayers perceived that power or trust was high, tax 
compliance was also high. Furthermore, additional backing for tax payments being 
determined by both perceived power and trust in authorities is shown in a survey with citizens 
from Austria, the UK and the Czech Republic that assessed authorities’ power, trust in 
authorities, enforced and voluntary tax compliance. The survey showed that voluntary tax 
compliance is positively associated with trust, power, and their interaction. Trust, however, 
had the largest effect. Power of authorities was found to be significantly positively associated 
with enforced compliance (Muehlbacher et al., 2011). These conclusions were also 
confirmed for a sample of self-employed Italian taxpayers by (Kastlunger et al., 2013).  
Furthermore, it was found that trust is positively related to legitimate, but negatively related 
to enforced power. Even if legitimate power is correlated to enforced compliance, the 
perception of the latter led to increased tax evasion. Another survey, (Kogler et al., 2015) 
also confirmed trust as being the driver of voluntary compliance and power as the main driver 
of enforced compliance. The authors identified social norms, an additional influencing factor 
for tax compliance, which, however, was not mediated by trust or power. The SSF 
assumptions were also tested in the context of fare avoidance through a sample of Austrian 
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users of public transport which stated their perception towards power, trust and degree of 
enforced compliance or voluntary cooperation in regard to the respective public 
transportation company (Wahl et al., 2011). The results indicated that perceived power was 
correlated with enforced compliance and that trust was correlated with voluntary cooperation. 
Hence, in both contexts the relationship between power and enforced compliance, and 
between trust and voluntary cooperation in the SSF were empirically confirmed using 
samples from different countries. The SSF indicates that both trust and power and their 
relationship influence the level of tax compliance (Kirchler et al., 2008). 
3 Research question and hypotheses 
This research work aims to assess the perception of Portuguese and Swiss individual 
taxpayers in relation to various aspects of their relationship with tax authorities and the 
respective impact on tax evasion, as well as to ascertain whether there are statistically 
significant differences in the scope of sociodemographic variables as well as religion. It is 
important to note that there are several relationships that can be tested, tax evasion (1), 
voluntary tax compliance (2) enforced tax compliance (3), our dependent variables. Variables 
(2) and (3) may also be considered as independent variables in relation to variable (1). The 
independent variables in this work will be the dimensions defined for the study of the 
interaction between taxpayers and tax authorities (voluntary tax compliance, enforced tax 
compliance, trust; legitimate power; coercive power; power and legitimacy).  
Next, the primary research question and respective hypotheses is presented, according to the 
objective of this research work. 
– What are the determinant dimensions in tax evasion? 
As a result, we formulate the following hypotheses: 
o H1: There is a relationship between taxpayers’ perception of enforced tax compliance and 
tax evasion; 
o H2: There is a relationship between taxpayers’ perception of voluntary tax compliance and 
tax evasion; 
o H3: There is a relationship between taxpayers’ perception of trust and tax evasion; 
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o H4: There is a relationship between taxpayers’ perception of legitimate power of tax 
authorities and tax evasion; 
o H5: There is a relationship between taxpayers’ perception of coercive power of tax 
authorities and tax evasion; 
In addition to the primary question, secondary research questions, are intended to provide a 
better understanding of the previously mentioned primary question (McKerchar., 2003 and 
Devos., 2014). Thus, we considered nine control variables (sociodemographic and religion): 
sex, age, conjugality, religion, CFBR, tax education, type of employment relationship, degree 
of comfort with earned income and the usage of services of a tax agent to submit the tax 
return which are widely used by other authors (McKerchar., 2003; Torgler., 2007; Devos., 
2014). 
After defining eight dimensions and nine control variables, we will then have 72 hypotheses. 
For example: is there a relationship between sex and trust in tax authorities? The respective 
hypothesis would be: there is a relationship between sex and trust in tax authorities. Thus, 
the secondary research question is presented below, according to the objective of this 
research work. 
– What control variable (s) lead to statistically significant differences in 
relation to the defined dimensions 
4 Methodology and Data 
4.1 Data collection 
In this chapter we present the methodology followed, with details regarding the data 
collection technique, the statistical instruments chosen for the respective analysis and the 
testing of the defined hypotheses.  
In order to test the main hypotheses, the data set was obtained through two questionnaires. 
The first step was to draft a questionnaire based on questions (indicators) previously 
elaborated and tested by other authors in other countries. The questionnaire survey is one of 
the data collection processes suggested by (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill., 2009 and Sekaran 
& Bougie., 2010). In the present case, the questionnaire consists of closed-answer questions, 
taking into account that this type of question enables the coding of responses and facilitates 
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the analysis of the data obtained. The questionnaire form was derived from (Kastlunger et al 
2013) study with Italian taxpayers. To ensure that all questions were properly understood by 
the respondents, as well as to ensure that there were no problems with the writing or the scale, 
the second step consisted of pre-testing the questionnaire (suggested by Sekaran & Bougie, 
2010), therefore was applied to a handful of volunteers. 
The questionnaire was applied to individuals tax residents in Portugal that had submitted at 
least one tax return in Portugal in the five previous fiscal years, the same principle was used 
for Switzerland. The questionnaire was made available online using the google forms 
platform and was shared across multiple social media platforms. The questionnaire was 
administered in 2019.  
Participation in the study was voluntary and the participants were assured that their answers 
would be kept confidential.  The questionnaire was translated from English into Portuguese 
for the Portuguese sample and used in English for the Swiss sample. In this study, nine 
variables of interest were measured. The participants were asked to indicate their degree of 
agreement with certain statements. 
With the intention of achieving the proposed objectives, the questionnaire was designed 
taking into account the type of questions, the nature of the variables and the scales of attitudes 
(Hill & Hill, 2008). In view of the literature review carried out it is expected that the 
taxpayer's attitudes, perceptions, as well as the interaction with tax authorities, are influenced 
by a set of variables, the influence of which should be verified through a direct effect. 
Additionally, there could be an influence of sociodemographic and religion variables on the 
variables under study.  
4.2 Target population and sample characterization 
The target population for this research work is made up of single taxpayers’ that had 
submitted a tax return in Portugal or Switzerland for personal income at least once during the 
previous five years. With regard to the sample, 179 responses were collected (97 in 
Switzerland and 82 in Portugal). The sample include individuals aged 18 years or over, with 
different professions and different levels of education. In terms of characterization of the 
sample, about 50.3% are male and 49.7% female. 
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The majority of the respondents 141 (80.1%) affirm to have submitted a tax return by 
themselves while the remaining 35 (19.9%) submitted their tax return with the support of an 
accountant or a similar situation. Note that of the 3 respondents affirmed that they should 
have submitted a tax return but did not. Thus, they were excluded from the analysis. 
As for age, respondents are between 18 and 64 years old, with an average age of 33 years. In 
terms of age groups, due to the sample size two age groups were formed one from 18 up to 
32 years old and another from 33 to 64 years old. About 53.1% of respondents are aged up 
to 32 years; 46.9% are aged between 33 and 64 years old. 
Regarding conjugality status, the largest group of respondents affirms to not live in 
conjugality (59.8%) while the remaining respondents (40.2%) affirms to live in conjugality. 
Regarding the level of education, 90.5% of the respondents affirm to have a university degree 
while the remaining 9.5% not. In relation to tax education, 56.4% of the respondents affirm 
to have a had some type of tax training while the remaining 43.6% had no tax training. 
In professional terms, more than 89.4% affirm to be employed while the remainder 
respondents affirm to be in a different situation. With regard to the current or past 
professional situation, most respondents work / worked for others (91.6%) with the remainder 
respondents worked for themselves (8.4%). 
In the characterization of the sample, an important point concerns to the income of the 
household. However, given the reluctance of many respondents to answer questions of this 
nature, the question about household income has been replaced by another question about the 
degree of comfort provided by the income, according to the European Values Survey (EVS). 
In these terms, almost half of the respondents (49.7%) answered that the household income 
is enough for them to live. The others replied that it is possible for them to live comfortably 
(27.4%), that it is difficult or very difficult to live on the income they have (22.9%).  
With regard to questions of a religious nature, 110 respondents (61.5%) have a current 
positive feeling of belonging to a religion. The remaining 69 respondents, say they didn’t feel 
of belonging to a religion. The respondents were further scrutinized about their religion, 30 




5 Results and discussion 
5.1 Descriptive analysis of the questionnaire and the creation of dimensions 
This chapter aims to analyse and discuss results. It integrates a descriptive analysis of the 
administered questionnaires (composed of a set of indicators, organized by sections linked to 
the variables under study). The indicators, components of each dimension, will be those that 
maximize Cronbach's alpha. In order to highlight the robustness of the analysis - taking into 
account both the sample size and the thematic nature of the present research work - we will 
not consider dimensions whose Cronbach's alpha is less than 0.60 [value suggested by 
Marôco & Garcia -Marques (2006), Stephenson (2010) and Silva (2015)]. For, if this 
happened, the dimension's validity would be questioned (Marôco & Garcia-Marques, 2006). 
The constituent indicators for dimension mentioned in “5.2” is subject to a five-point Likert 
scale, where 1 = highly unlikely and 5 = very likely, while from “5.3 to 5.9” 1 = Strongly 
disagree and 5 = Strongly agree. 
5.2 Tax Evasion 
For the analysis of tax evasion, the indicators of the two administered questionnaires were 
measured, which are presented in the following table, with their descriptive statistics.  
Table 5.1. “Tax Evasion” 
Indicator N Min Max Avg SD 
1 
A customer paid in cash and did not require an invoice. You 
could intentionally omit this income on your income tax return. 
How likely is it that you would omit this income? 
179 1 5 2.21 1.44 
2 
You bought some of your goods privately. You could resell those 
goods later to established customer and omit the profit from this 
sale on your income tax return. How likely would you be to omit 
the profit from this sale on your income tax return? 
179 1 5 2.06 1.34 
3 
You could intentionally declare restaurant bills for meals you had 
with your friends as business meals. How likely would you be to 
declare those restaurant bills as business meals? 
179 1 5 2.75 1.54 
4 
You have been abroad to meet relatives and to have a short 
meeting with one of your suppliers. Regardless of this you could 
declare your expenses for the hotel and for the meals you invited 
your relatives to, as business travel and a business meal. How 
likely would you be to declare your expenses as business travel or 
a business meal? 
179 1 5 3.07 1.45 
5 
Recently you took part in a project in an acquaintance's company. 
Now you could conceal this taxable additional income on your 
income tax return. How likely is it that you would conceal this 
additional income? 
179 1 5 2.77 1.54 
Tax Evasion 179 1 5 2.57 1.24 
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As we can see from the table 5.1, from the set of 5 indicators related to people who would 
not declare all their income, only indicator number four (4) presents an average higher than 
the centre of the scale, which appears to indicate that there is a low tendency for evading 
taxation in both countries. 
The “Tax Compliance” index was then created using the arithmetic mean of the indicators 
relating to the likelihood of tax avoidance (1 to 5), obtaining a Cronbach's Alpha of 0.905, 
considered excellent reliability (George & Mallery, 2003 and Stephenson, 2010). 
The results obtained show that “Tax Evasion” presents an average lower than the centre of 
the scale (3), revealing a favourable tax attitude of taxpayers towards their tax obligations. 
In comparative terms, we will evaluate “Tax Evasion” according to several variables: 
country, tax return submission, gender, tax education level, conjugality, the current feeling 
of belonging to a religion (CFBR), age and degree of comfort with the income earned by the 
household. The results obtained are shown in the tables below. 
Table 5.2 “Tax Evasion” – T Test 
Variables Descriptive Statistics T Test 
Cronbach's 
Alpha Designation Groups Average 
Standard 
Deviation 










































































* p < 0,10; ** p < 0,05; *** p < 0,01 
Table 5.3 “Tax Evasion” – Scheffé Test by Religion 
Groups 
Descriptive Statistics ANOVA Test Scheffé Test 
Average Standard Deviation Obs. Teste F Bartlett Very Somewhat 
Very 2.64 1.25 30 
3.65** 3.31 
- - 
Somewhat 2.32 1.10 83 -0.32 - 
Not +Atheist 2.86 1.36 66 0.22 0.54** 




Table 5.4 “Tax Evasion” – Scheffé Test by Degree of comfort with the income  
Groups 
Descriptive Statistics ANOVA Test Scheffé Test 
Average Standard Deviation Obs. Teste F Bartlett Confortable Ok 
Confortable 2.27 1.13 49 
7.89*** 0.97 
- - 
Ok 2.45 1.26 89 0.18 - 
Dif or V.Dif 3.21 1.14 41 0.94*** 0.76*** 
* p < 0,10; ** p < 0,05; *** p < 0,01 
The results shown through tables 5.1-5.4, that “Tax Evasion” is higher in Portugal than in 
Switzerland. In relation to the other variables, “Tax Evasion” is higher among those who do 
not submit a tax return by themselves, the female gender, do not have tax training, those who 
live in conjugality, those who are not religious and those who have more than 32 years old. 
There is a statistically significant difference in the variable tax return submissions and 
religion. Note that in the Scheffé test by religion, the hypothesis of inequality of variances is 
rejected for a significance level of 0.01. 
5.3 Enforced Tax Compliance 
For the analysis of tax compliance, the indicators of the two administered questionnaires 
were measured, which are presented in the following table, with their descriptive statistics.  
Table 5.5 “Enforced Tax Compliance” 
Indicator N Min Max Avg SD 
1 
When I pay my taxes as required by the regulations, I do 
so because a great many tax audits are carried out. 
179 1 5 3.48 1.27 
2 
When I pay my taxes as required by the regulations, I do 
so because the tax office often carries out audits. 
179 1 5 3.45 1.29 
3 
When I pay my taxes as required by the regulations, I do 
so because I know that I  
will be audited. 
179 1 5 2.88 1.30 
4 
When I pay my taxes as required by the regulations, I do 
so because the punishments for tax evasion are very 
severe. 
179 1 5 3.89 1.17 
5 
When I pay my taxes as required by the regulations, I do 
so because I do not know exactly how to evade taxes 
without attracting attention. 
179 1 5 3.13 1.47 
Enforced Tax Compliance 179 1 5 3.37 1.04 
 
The data in table 5.5 allows us to conclude that, on average, the enforced tax compliance is 
higher than the centre of the scale. When we take a closer look at the individual indicators, 
we can see that indicator number four “When I pay my taxes as required by the regulations, 
I do so because the punishments for tax evasion are very severe.” presents the higher average 
in both countries, which indicates that the severity of the punishments from tax authorities in 
case of tax noncompliance seems to be the strongest factor for enforcing tax compliance.  
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As with the other subsections of the questionnaire previously analysed, a new dimension was 
created - “Enforced Tax Compliance”. The dimension in question was calculated based on 
the arithmetic mean of the five indicators present in table 5.5, whose Cronbach's alpha is 
0.857, indicating an excellent reliability. The results are listed in the bottom row of table 5.6. 
From its analysis we can conclude that this dimension presents an average above the centre 
of the scale for Switzerland and at the centre for Portugal, revealing a high degree of enforced 
tax compliance in the Swiss case and average degree of tax compliance in the Portuguese 
case. 
Table 5.6 “Enforced Tax Compliance” – T Test 
Variables Descriptive Statistics T Test 
Cronbach's 
Alpha Designation Groups Average 
Standard 
Deviation 










































































* p < 0,10; ** p < 0,05; *** p < 0,01 
Table 5.7 “Enforced Tax Compliance” – Scheffé Test by Religion 
Groups 
Descriptive Statistics ANOVA Test Scheffé Test 
Average Standard Deviation Obs. Teste F Bartlett Very Somewhat 
Very 3.75 0.93 30 
7.21*** 7.39** 
- - 
Somewhat 3.51 0.87 83 -0.24 - 
Not +Atheist 3.01 1.18 66 -0.74*** 0.50** 
* p < 0,10; ** p < 0,05; *** p < 0,01 
Table 5.8 “Enforced Tax Compliance” – Scheffé Test by Degree of comfort with the income  
Groups 
Descriptive Statistics ANOVA Test Scheffé Test 
Average Standard Deviation Obs. Teste F Bartlett Comfortable Ok 
Confortable 3.27 1.13 49 
1.04 2.70 
- - 
Ok 3.33 1.05 89 0.06 - 
Dif or V.Dif 3.57 0.88 41 0.30 0.24 
* p < 0,10; ** p < 0,05; *** p < 0,01 
The results shown through tables 5.5-5.8, that “enforced tax compliance” is higher in 
Switzerland than in Portugal. In relation to the other variables, “Enforced Tax Compliance” 
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is higher among those who do not submit a tax return by themselves, the male sex, do not 
have tax training, those who live in conjugality, those who are religious and those who have 
more than 32 years old. There is a statistically significant difference in the variable country. 
Note that in the Scheffé test by religion, the hypothesis of inequality of variances is rejected 
for a significance level of 0.01. 
5.4 Voluntary Tax Compliance 
For the analysis of Voluntary tax compliance, the indicators of the two administered 
questionnaires were measured, which are presented in the following table, with their 
descriptive statistics. 
Table 5.9 “Voluntary Tax Compliance” 
Indicator N  Min Max Avg SD 
1 
When I pay my taxes as required by the regulations, I do so 
because, to me, it's obvious that this is what you do. 
179 1 5 3.80 1.23 
2 
When I pay my taxes as required by the regulations, I do so to 
support the state and other citizens. 
179 1 5 3.81 1.24 
3 
When I pay my taxes as required by the regulations, I do so 
because I like to contribute to everyone's good. 
179 1 5 3.64 1.27 
4 
When I pay my taxes as required by the regulations, I do so 
because, for me, it's the natural thing to do. 
179 1 5 4.15 1.13 
5 
When I pay my taxes as required by the regulations, I do so 
because I regard it as my duty as a citizen. 
179 1 5 4.25 1.06 
Voluntary Tax Compliance  1 5 3.93 1.01 
 
The data in table 5.9 allows us to conclude that, on average, the respondents tend to cooperate 
with tax authorities with averages above the centre of the scale. 
As with the other subsections of the questionnaire previously analysed, a new dimension was 
created - “Voluntary Tax Compliance”. The dimension in question was calculated based on 
the arithmetic mean of the five indicators present in table 5.9, whose Cronbach's alpha is 
0.91, indicating an excellent reliability. The results are listed in the bottom row of table 5.9. 
From its analysis we can conclude that this dimension presents an average above the centre 
of the scale for both countries, explicitly revealing the high cooperation by taxpayers with 






Table 5.10 “Voluntary Tax Compliance” – T Test 
Variables Descriptive Statistics T Test 
Cronbach's 
Alpha Designation Groups Average 
Standard 
Deviation 










































































* p < 0,10; ** p < 0,05; *** p < 0,01 
Table 5.11 “Voluntary Tax Compliance” – Scheffé Test by Religion 
Groups 
Descriptive Statistics ANOVA Test Scheffé Test 
Average Standard Deviation Obs. Teste F Bartlett Very Somewhat 
Very 3.94 1.01 30 
0.35 0.02 
- - 
Somewhat 3.99 1.01 83 0.05 - 
Not +Atheist 3.85 1.03 66 -0.09 -0.14 
* p < 0,10; ** p < 0,05; *** p < 0,01 
Table 5.12 “Voluntary Tax Compliance” – Scheffé Test by Degree of comfort with the income  
Groups 
Descriptive Statistics ANOVA Test Scheffé Test 
Average Standard Deviation Obs. Teste F Bartlett Comfortable Ok 
Confortable 4.09 0.94 49 
14.97*** 18.43*** 
- - 
Ok 4.16 0.74 89 0.07 - 
Dif or V.Dif 3.22 1.28 41 -0.87*** -0.94*** 
* p < 0,10; ** p < 0,05; *** p < 0,01 
The results shown through tables 5.9-5.12, that “voluntary tax compliance” is higher in 
Switzerland than in Portugal. Swiss taxpayers have an especially high voluntary tax 
cooperation (4.19) while Portuguese Taxpayers have a slightly lower value (3.61). In relation 
to the other variables, “voluntary Tax Compliance” is higher among those who do submit a 
tax return by themselves, do not have tax training, those who live in conjugality, those who 
are religious and those who have less than 33 years old. There is a statistically significant 
difference in the variable country. 
5.5 Trust 
For the analysis of trust, the indicators of the two administered questionnaires were measured, 
which are presented in the following table, with their descriptive statistics. 
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Table 5.13 “Trust” 
Indicator N Min Max Avg SD 
1 The tax authorities have supported the taxpayers 179 1 5 3.42 1.27 
2 The tax authorities are treating citizens correctly 179 1 5 3.41 1.35 
3 The tax authorities are a trustworthy institution 179 1 5 3.58 1.12 
4 The tax authorities are a reliable institution 179 1 5 3.70 1.08 
5 The tax authorities are treating citizens in a respectful manner 179 1 5 3.57 1.22 
Trust 179 1 5 3.54 1.10 
The results obtained in the table above related to the trust in tax authorities show that the 
respondents, on average, have trust in TA. The fourth dimension “Trust” was created, based 
on the eleven indicators analysed in table above. With the aggregation of these indicators, 
through their arithmetic mean, a Cronbach's alpha of 0.946 was obtained, considered as 
excellent (Marôco & Garcia-Marques, 2006 and Stephenson, 2010). The results linked to the 
descriptive statistics are presented in the last line of table 5.13 The “Trust” dimension is 
evaluated, in comparative terms, through the various variables, the results of which are 
presented below. 
Table 5.14 “Trust” – T Test 
Variables Descriptive Statistics T Test 
Cronbach's 
Alpha Designation Groups Average 
Standard 
Deviation 










































































* p < 0,10; ** p < 0,05; *** p < 0,01 
Table 5.15 “Trust” – Scheffé Test by Religion 
Groups 
Descriptive Statistics ANOVA Test Scheffé Test 
Average Standard Deviation Obs. Teste F Bartlett Very Somewhat 
Very 3.41 1.10 30 
3.97** 8.16** 
- - 
Somewhat 3.78 0.90 83 0.37 - 
Not +Atheist 3.29 1.26 66 -0.11 -0.49** 




Table 5.16 “Trust” – Scheffé Test by Degree of comfort with the income  
Groups 
Descriptive Statistics ANOVA Test Scheffé Test 
Average Standard Deviation Obs. Teste F Bartlett Comfortable Ok 
Confortable 3.69 1.21 49 
2.39* 4.80* 
- - 
Ok 3.60 0.95 89 -0.09 - 
Dif or V.Dif 3.22 1.21 41 -0.47 -0.42 
* p < 0,10; ** p < 0,05; *** p < 0,01 
The results shown through tables 5.13-5.16, that “trust” is higher in Switzerland than in 
Portugal. In relation to the other variables, “trust” is higher among those who do submit a tax 
return with support, the male sex, do not have tax training, those who live in conjugality, 
those who are religious and those who have more than 32 years old. There are statistically 
significant differences in the variable’s country, conjugality and religion. Note that in the 
Scheffé test by religion and Degree of comfort with the income, the hypothesis of inequality 
of variances is rejected for a significance level of 0.01. 
5.6 Legitimate Power 
For the analysis of legitimate power, the indicators of the two administered questionnaires 
were measured, which are presented in the following table, with their descriptive statistics. 
Table 5.17 “Legitimate Power” 
Indicator N  Min Max Avg SD 
1 Tax Evasion is detected in a high percentage of the cases 179 1 5 2.70 1.05 
2 Tax authorities combat tax crimes in an efficient way 179 1 5 2.92 1.08 
3 Tax evasion is likely to be detected 179 1 5 3.19 0.90 
4 Tax authorities control frequently and profoundly 179 1 5 3.23 1.05 
5 
Due to their knowledge and competence, tax authorities are able to 
detect every act of tax evasion 
179 1 5 2.38 1.17 
Legitimate Power 179 1 5 2.88 0.76 
 
The data in table 5.17 allows us to conclude that, on average, the respondents perceive that 
the tax authorities legitimate power is moderately low. However, indicator number 4 presents 
an average value of 3.23 which appears to indicate that taxpayers admit that tax authorities 
control frequently and profoundly. 
As with the other subsections of the questionnaire previously analysed, a new dimension was 
created “Legitimate Power. The dimension in question was calculated based on the arithmetic 
mean of the five indicators present in table 5.17, whose Cronbach's alpha is 0.769, indicating 
an acceptable reliability. The results are listed in the bottom row of table 5.18. From its 
analysis we can conclude that this dimension presents an average above the centre of the 
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scale for Switzerland, while for Portugal it indicates an average below the centre of the scale, 
explicitly revealing the low perception by Portuguese taxpayers on tax authorities’ 
“Legitimate Power”. 
Table 5.18 “Legitimate Power” – T Test 
Variables Descriptive Statistics T Test 
Cronbach's 
Alpha Designation Groups Average 
Standard 
Deviation 










































































* p < 0,10; ** p < 0,05; *** p < 0,01 
Table 5.19 “Legitimate Power” – Scheffé Test by Religion 
Groups 
Descriptive Statistics ANOVA Test Scheffé Test 
Average Standard Deviation Obs. Teste F Bartlett Very Somewhat 
Very 2.93 0.72 30 
0.16 0.22 
- - 
Somewhat 2.90 0.77 83 -0.03 - 
Not +Atheist 2.85 0.77 66 -0.08 -0.05 
* p < 0,10; ** p < 0,05; *** p < 0,01 
Table 5.20 “Legitimate Power” – Scheffé Test by Degree of comfort with the income  
Groups 
Descriptive Statistics ANOVA Test Scheffé Test 
Average Standard Deviation Obs. Teste F Bartlett Comfortable Ok 
Confortable 3.14 0.77 49 
5.32*** 0.21 
- - 
Ok 2.85 0.73 89 -0.29* - 
Dif or V.Dif 2.64 0.74 41 -0.50*** -0.21 
* p < 0,10; ** p < 0,05; *** p < 0,01 
The results shown through tables 5.17-5.20, that “Legitimate Power” is higher in Switzerland 
than in Portugal. In relation to the other variables, “Legitimate Power” is higher among those 
who do submit a tax return with support, the male sex, do not have tax training, those who 
live in conjugality, those who are religious and those who have more than 32 years old. There 
are statistically significant differences in the variable’s country, sex and conjugality.  
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5.7 Coercive Power 
For the analysis of Coercive power, the indicators of the two administered questionnaires 
were measured, which are presented in the following table, with their descriptive statistics. 
Table 5.21 “Coercive Power” 
Indicator N Min Max Avg SD 
1 Tax authorities primarily aim to punish 179 1 5 2.42 1.33 
2 Tax authorities investigate as long as they find something 179 1 5 3.36 1.17 
3 Tax authorities' interventions are too severe 179 1 5 3.41 1.06 
4 Tax authorities nurture hostile feelings towards taxpayers 179 1 5 2.53 1.36 
5 
Tax authorities interpret tax laws in order to punish the highest 
number of taxpayers 
179 1 5 2.64 1.34 
Coercive Power 179 1 5 2.87 0.88 
 
The data in table 5.21 allows us to conclude that, on average, the perceive that the tax 
authorities has a low coercive power. However, indicators 2 and 3 present average values of 
3.36 and 3.41, respectively, these medium values above the centre of the scale allow us to 
conclude that taxpayers admit that tax authorities investigate as long as they find something 
and that tax authorities’ interventions are severe. 
As with the other subsections of the questionnaire previously analysed, a new dimension was 
created - “Coercive Power. The dimension in question was calculated based on the arithmetic 
mean of the five indicators present in table 5.21, whose Cronbach's alpha is 0.741, indicating 
an acceptable reliability. The results are listed in the bottom row of table 5.21. From its 
analysis we can conclude that this dimension presents an average below the centre of the 
scale for both countries, explicitly revealing the low perception by taxpayers on tax 




Table 5.22 “Coercive Power” – T Test 
Variables Descriptive Statistics T Test 
Cronbach's 
Alpha Designation Groups Average 
Standard 
Deviation 










































































* p < 0,10; ** p < 0,05; *** p < 0,01 
Table 5.23 “Coercive Power” – Scheffé Test by Religion 
Groups 
Descriptive Statistics ANOVA Test Scheffé Test 
Average Standard Deviation Obs. Teste F Bartlett Very Somewhat 
Very 2.93 0.72 30 
0.20 2.77 
- - 
Somewhat 2.83 0.89 83 -0.10 - 
Not +Atheist 2.90 0.95 66 -0.03 0.07 
* p < 0,10; ** p < 0,05; *** p < 0,01 
Table 5.24 “Coercive Power” – Scheffé Test by Degree of comfort with the income  
Groups 
Descriptive Statistics ANOVA Test Scheffé Test 
Average Standard Deviation Obs. Teste F Bartlett Comfortable Ok 
Confortable 2.85 0.79 49 
4.31** 2.33 
- - 
Ok 2.73 0.84 89 -0.12 - 
Dif or V.Dif 3.20 0.99 41 0.35 0.47** 
* p < 0,10; ** p < 0,05; *** p < 0,01 
The results shown through tables 5.21-5.24, that “Coercive Power” is higher in Switzerland 
than in Portugal. In relation to the other variables, “Coercive Power” is higher among those 
who do submit a tax return with support, the female sex, do not have tax training, those who 
live in conjugality, those who are not religious and those who have more than 32 years old. 
There is statistically significant difference in the variable conjugality.  
5.8 Key takeaways from of the results obtained 
With the previous analysis of the dimensions, below we summarize the variables with higher 

















Tax Evasion X X  X  X  X X 6 
Enforced Tax 
Compliance 
X X   X X X X  6 
Voluntary Tax 
compliance 
X   X  X   X 4 
Trust X X  X X X X X X 8 
Legitimate 
Power 
X  X  X    X 4 




















We conducted two quantitative surveys, Switzerland (N = 97) and Portugal (N = 82). The 
results obtained point to country and degree of “degree of comfort with the income” as the 
variable with more dimensions that have statistically significant differences in means (5 out 
of 6). Thus, the differences between Swiss and Portuguese taxpayers in relation to certain 
matters of a tax nature are remarkable. It would be a good topic for further research to find 
what leads to these differences. Additionally, the degree of comfort with the income was 
found as key socio demographic variable, as it is common for the income to be a decisive 
factor in regards to topics related to tax compliance.    
Regarding the dimensions with most differences of statistically significant means, the 
dimensions “Tax Evasion”, “Trust” and “Enforced Tax Compliance” are the ones with most 
differences in means across the various groups, with respectively, 6, 8 and 6 
sociodemographic variables. 
5.9 Econometric model analysis 
Through an econometric model, it is intended, according to the title of this section, to infer 
which dimensions have explanatory power to explain the dependent variable, in our case the 
“Tax Evasion” dimension will be the dependent variable and the remaining identified 





Table 5. 26 “Output” ANOVA 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 91,858 5 18,372 17,292 ,000b 
Residual 183,802 173 1,062   
Total 275,660 178    
a. Dependent Variable: taxevasion 
b. Predictors: (Constant), coerpow, trust, enftaxcomp, legpow, voltaxcomp 
 
Table 5.26 presents the output of the model for estimating the effect of independent variables 
on the taxevasion variable. First, we checked the p-value for the chi-square (Prob> Chi2). 
This is a test in which all the estimated coefficients are equal to zero, that is, it is a test of the 
model as a whole. Since the p-value is less than the α of 5% or 10%, then the null hypothesis 
is rejected, that is, the model is statistically significant. 






t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 2,897 ,502  5,776 ,000 
Enftaxcomp ,351 ,082 ,293 4,281 ,000 
Voltaxcomp -,261 ,097 -,213 -2,686 ,008 
Trust -,272 ,105 -,217 -2,596 ,010 
Legpow -,221 ,114 -,134 -1,932 ,055 
Coerpow ,367 ,099 ,260 3,689 ,000 
 
Table 5.27 shows the Pearson correlation matrix between the variables studied, where it can 
be seen that for the statistically significant relationships, the intensity of the association 
between variables is high. Regarding voluntary tax compliance, trust and legitimate power, 
we found that these variables are statistically significant and negatively correlated with tax 
evasion, thus corroborating H2, H3 and H4. On the other hand, there is a positive and 
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statistically significant correlation between taxevasion and the variables enforced tax 
compliance and coercive power, which allows corroborating H1 and H5 of the study. 
The p-value for each variable in the model is identified and that tests individual significance 
(p> | z |). All variables are statistically significant, since the p-value is lower than the α of 
10%. From the table we can also assess the beta values, we observe that enforced tax 
compliance and coercive power exert a positive impact on tax evasion while voluntary tax 
compliance, trust and legitimate power exert a negative impact on tax evasion.  





1 (Constant)   
Enftaxcomp ,821 1,218 
Voltaxcomp ,614 1,628 
Trust ,551 1,816 
Legpow ,795 1,257 
Coerpow ,778 1,286 
a. Dependent Variable: taxevasion 
 
The table above tests the assumption of independence of residual variables. The tolerance is 
high- indicating the absence of multicollinearity - VIF values are low. 
6 Conclusions, limitations and topics for future research 
6.1 Conclusions 
The aim of this research was to explore the relationship between the tax residency 
(Switzerland and Portugal) and attitudes toward tax compliance among singular taxpayers 
within the context of the slippery slope framework (Kastlunger et al., 2013; Kirchler et al., 
2008). Results suggest that people with different tax residency approach tax compliance and 
tax evasion in very specific ways. 
The non-compliant tax behaviours (i.e., tax avoidance) in the analysis are stronger among 
Portuguese tax payers than with Swiss taxpayers. This could account for some results, such 
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as the fact that Portuguese (compared to the Swiss) expressed lower levels of voluntary 
compliance. In this regard, we might guess that, because of their higher levels of enforced 
compliance, Portuguese taxpayers might be more inclined to avoid taxes, following Kirchler 
and Wahl’s (2010) assumption that “when trust is low, but authorities’ power to effectively 
audit and sanction wrong behaviour is strong”.  
Swiss, in particular, express very high levels of voluntary tax compliance and seem more 
inclined to consider tax compliance a civic duty, pointing out the collective consequences of 
tax evasion. This pathway of the slippery slope framework is the one deriving from trust, that 
influenced tax compliance significantly.  
The results have theoretical and practical implications. From a theoretical perspective, the 
present study enriches previous literature on the slippery slope framework, confirming the 
existence of two different pathways that lead to tax compliance and hinting at a potential link 
between trust and evaluations of public expenditures. In the original framework (Kirchler et 
al., 2008) and its developments (Kastlunger et al., 2013; Muehlbacher & Kirchler, 2010; 
Wahl et al., 2010), trust is mainly dependent on the type of interaction between tax authorities 
and taxpayers, along with their commitment to the society in which they live (see also Feld 
& Frey, 2007). The present findings suggest that the evaluation by taxpayers of the way 
public resources are managed might be another antecedent of their trust in tax authorities, 
and consequently of their voluntary cooperation. These findings suggest that the authorities 
should act in correspondence to the beliefs and attitudes of the taxpayers to increase their 
cooperation in a responsive regulation approach (Braithwaite, 2003). More specifically, tax 
authorities may use different methods and strategies to enhance tax compliance, responding 
to the beliefs and attitudes of taxpayers based on their political preferences. 
Among Swiss taxpayers, who show higher levels of voluntary cooperation, authorities should 
be careful when auditing and fining taxpayers to avoid creating an antagonistic climate, 
because these individuals are more sensitive to the power dimension, a strong display of 
which might decrease their cooperation. For the Swiss a “service and client” approach is 
more effective to increase the level of tax compliance, whereas excessive deterrence might 
backfire. Among Portuguese taxpayers, on the other hand, it could be relevant to find ways 
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to increase their voluntary cooperation by increasing their trust and paying attention to the 
perception of the way public expenditures are managed. 
These practical implications might be useful, both for tax and political authorities, when 
trying to promote taxpayer compliance. However, the fact that the same policies may meet 
differential responses among different groups of taxpayers enhances one of the basic 
assumptions of the slippery slope framework: that maintaining or achieving a high level of 
tax compliance in a social system is like operating on a slippery slope, because of the complex 
interaction of trust and power (Kirchler, 2007; Kirchler et al., 2008). Although further 
research on this topic is advisable, these results bear relevant theoretical and practical 
implications. 
6.2 Limitation and future research 
As the analysis is based on self-reports its limitations must be mentioned, results have to be 
interpreted in this light, and socially desirable responses cannot be ruled out. As tax non-
compliance is an illegal and prosecuted behavior, self-reports may rather comply with tax 
law than reflect actual tax behavior. Nevertheless, an enforced tax compliance and voluntary 
tax compliance have to be assessed with questionnaires, as there is no measurable difference 
in actual behavior between these factors, the current approach seems the most promising.  
In the slippery slope framework (Kirchler, 2007; Kirchler et al., 2008), an interaction of 
perceived power and trust is assumed. In the current study, this interaction was not tested due 
to the small sample size. It might be that in the current sample several interactions are 
effective. As mentioned above, the interaction of power and trust can have several different 
characteristics and various impacts on tax payments. Although, the present study answers 
some questions regarding the support of the slippery slope framework (Kirchler, 2007; 
Kirchler et al., 2008), it raises several new questions. First, the relation of power and trust, a 
closer theoretical and empirical inspection of the interaction and its impact on tax payments 
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I. Appendix A – English Questionnaire 
The purpose of this questionnaire is to study the relationship between the Swiss tax authorities (cantonal or 
federal) and the Swiss taxpayers and their impact on personal income tax compliance, and should be answered 
by individual taxpayers who are/were not Personal income tax exempt in Switzerland. It is part of a master's 
project in accounting and taxation that is being developed at the Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão 
(ISEG), University of Lisbon (UL). 
 
Please be aware of the response instructions that appear throughout the questionnaire. 
 
Remember that there are no right or wrong answers, all of them are important. 
 
The questionnaire is anonymous and we guarantee the confidentiality of the data. Responses will only be dealt 
with in aggregate form and will not allow individual identification. For any questions or concerns, please contact 
the investigator via email at msjrodrigues@outlook.com. 
 
We thank you in advance for your valuable cooperation without which this project would not be achievable. 
 
NOTE: Internet Explorer has errors when answering the questionnaire. Please use Chrome, Firefox or Safari 
browsers.   
 
Tax Declaration Submission 
Please select the option below that most closely matches your situation: 
Did you file a self-assessment tax return in Switzerland in the last five years? 
1 Yes, I submitted a tax return myself  
2 No, I did not submit a tax return, but I should have  
3 No, I did not submit a tax return because I didn't need to  
4 Yes, but an accountant/adviser/agent submitted it on my behalf  
 
A – Tax Evasion 
A1. Below are some statements made regarding compliance with tax obligations. The statements concern 
one aspect of the so-called shadow economy. In this case they refer to situations in which instalments of 
income are received in the form of “cash in hand”, not declared for tax purposes. Indicate, for each 
statement, your degree of agreement. 5 = Most likely; 4 = Likely; 3 = Neutral; 2 = Unlikely; 1 = Very 
unlikely.  
  1 2 3 4 5 
1 
A customer paid in cash and did not require an invoice. You could intentionally omit this 
income on your income tax return. How likely is it that you would omit this income? 
     
2 
You bought some of your goods privately. You could resell those goods later to established 
customer and omit the profit from this sale on your income tax return. How likely would 
you be to omit the profit from this sale on your income tax return? 
     
3 
You could intentionally declare restaurant bills for meals you had with your friends as 
business meals. How likely would you be to declare those restaurant bills as business meals? 
     
4 
You have been abroad to meet relatives and to have a short meeting with one of your 
suppliers. Regardless of this you could declare your expenses for the hotel and for the meals 
you invited your relatives to, as business travel and a business meal. How likely would you 
be to declare your expenses as business travel or a business meal? 
     
5 
Recently you took part in a project in an acquaintance's company. Now you could conceal 
this taxable additional income on your income tax return. How likely is it that you would 
conceal this additional income? 





B – Tax Compliance – Coercive and Voluntary 
B1. Indicate, for each of the following statements, your degree of agreement. 5 = Strongly Agree; 4 = 
Agree; 3 = neither agree nor disagree; 2 = Disagree; 1 = Strongly disagree. 
 
When I pay my taxes as required by the regulations, … 
  1 2 3 4 5 
1 I do so because a great many tax audits are carried out.      
2 I do so because the tax office often carries out audits.      
3 I do so because I know that I will be audited.      
4 I do so because the punishments for tax evasion are very severe.      
5 I do so because I do not know exactly how to evade taxes without attracting attention.      
 
B2. Indicate, for each of the following statements, your degree of agreement. 5 = Strongly Agree; 4 = 
Agree; 3 = neither agree nor disagree; 2 = Disagree; 1 = Strongly disagree. 
 
When I pay my taxes as required by the regulations, … 
  1 2 3 4 5 
1 I do so because, to me, it's obvious that this is what you do.      
2 I do so to support the state and other citizens.      
3 I do so because I like to contribute to everyone's good.      
4 I do so because, for me, it's the natural thing to do.      
5 I do so because I regard it as my duty as a citizen.      
 
C – Trust 
 
C1. Think about tax authorities and what was done over the past few years. Indicate, for each of the 
following statements, your degree of agreement. 5 = Strongly Agree; 4 = Agree; 3 = neither agree nor 
disagree; 2 = Disagree; 1 = Strongly disagree. 
  1 2 3 4 5 
1 The tax authorities support the taxpayers.      
2 Tax authorities are treating citizens correctly.      
3 Tax authorities seem reliable.      
4 Tax authorities are trustworthy.      
5 Tax authorities are treating citizens in a respectful manner.      
 
D – Tax System 
 
D1. The following statements refer to your perception of the legitimate power of the Tax Authorities. 
Indicate, for each of the following statements, your degree of agreement. 5 = Strongly Agree; 4 = Agree; 
3 = neither agree nor disagree; 2 = Disagree; 1 = Strongly disagree. 
  1 2 3 4 5 
1 Tax evasion is detected in a high percentage of the cases.      
2 Tax authorities combat tax crimes in an efficient way.      
3 Tax evasion is likely to be detected.      
4 Tax authorities control frequently and profoundly.      
5 
Devido ao seu conhecimento e competência, a AT é capaz de detectar quase todos os atos 
de fraude fiscal 
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D2. The following statements refer to your perception of the coercive power of the Tax Authorities. 
Indicate, for each of the following statements, your degree of agreement. 5 = Strongly Agree; 4 = Agree; 
3 = neither agree nor disagree; 2 = Disagree; 1 = Strongly disagree. 
  1 2 3 4 5 
1 Tax authorities primarily aim to punish      
2 Tax authorities investigate as long as they find something.      
3 Tax authorities’ interventions are too severe.      
4 Tax authorities nurture hostile feelings towards taxpayers      
5 Tax authorities interpret tax laws in order to punish the highest number of taxpayers      
 
E – Sociodemographic Data 
 
E1. Sex:  M •  F • 
 
E2. Age: ________ 
 
E3. Are you college educated? Yes • No • 
 
E4. Have you had any tax training? Yes • No • 
 
E5. 5. Do you live in conjugality? Yes • No • 
 
E6. What is your job status, are you employed? Yes • No • 
 
E7. In your main job are/were you working on behalf of another? Yes • No • 
 
E8. Which of the following statements most accurately describes your feeling towards your current 
household income? 
1 Current income allows you to live comfortably  
2 Current income is enough to live  
3 It's hard to live with current income  
4 It is very difficult to live with current income  
 
E9. Regardless of belonging to a particular religion, I would say that I'm a person  
Not religious •  Somewhat religious • Very religious • Convict Atheist • 
 




II. Appendix B – Portuguese Questionnaire 
Este questionário tem como objetivo o estudo da relação entre as autoridades fiscais portuguesas e os 
contribuintes portugueses e o seu impacto no cumprimento fiscal em sede IRS, pelo que deverá ser respondido 
por contribuintes singulares sujeitos e não isentos de IRS. Integra-se num projeto de mestrado em contabilidade 
e fiscalidade que está a ser desenvolvido no Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão (ISEG), da Universidade 
de Lisboa (UL).  
 
Pedimos-lhe que tenha atenção às instruções de resposta que aparecem ao longo de todo o questionário. 
 
Lembramos que não há respostas certas nem erradas, todas elas são importantes. 
 
O questionário é anónimo pelo que garantimos a confidencialidade dos dados. As respostas serão tratadas 
apenas de forma agregada, não permitindo, por conseguinte, a identificação individual. Para o esclarecimento 
de qualquer questão ou dúvida, por favor queira entrar em contacto com o investigador, via e-mail, através do 
endereço msjrodrigues@outlook.com. 
 
Agradecemos-lhe, desde já, a sua preciosa colaboração, sem a qual este trabalho não seria possível. 
 
NOTA: Por favor utilize os browsers Chrome, Firefox ou Safari. O Internet Explorer tem erros na apresentacao 
do questionario. Obrigado 
 
Submissão de Declaração Fiscal 
Por favor selecione a opção que mais se aproxima com a sua situação: 
Submeteu alguma declaração de rendimentos em Portugal nos últimos cinco anos? 
1 Sim, submeti sozinho uma declaração de rendimentos  
2 Não submeti uma declaração de rendimentos, mas deveria  
3 Não submeti uma declaração de rendimentos porque não necessitava  
4 




A – Fraude Fiscal 
A1. De seguida serão apresentadas algumas afirmações produzidas a respeito do cumprimento das 
obrigações fiscais. As afirmações dizem respeito a um aspeto da chamada economia paralela. No caso são 
referentes a situações nas quais parcelas de rendimento são recebidas sob a forma de “dinheiro na mão”, 
não declarado para efeitos fiscais. Indique, para cada afirmação, o seu grau de concordância. 5 = Muito 
provável; 4 = Provável; 3 = Neutro; 2 = Improvável 1 = Muito improvável.  
  1 2 3 4 5 
1 
Um cliente pagou-lhe em dinheiro e não exigiu fatura. Você poderia, intencionalmente, 
ocultar esse rendimento na sua declaração de rendimento. Qual a probabilidade de você 
ocultar esse rendimento? 
     
2 
Imagine que comprou um conjunto de mercadorias a um particular. Suponha que teria a 
possibilidade de revender, mais tarde, essas mercadorias aos seus clientes e poder ocultar o 
lucro dessa venda na sua declaração de rendimento. Qual a probabilidade de você ocultar o 
lucro dessa venda na sua declaração de rendimento? 
     
3 
Você pode declarar, intencionalmente, na contabilidade do seu negócio, despesas com 
refeições que teve com seus amigos. Qual seria a probabilidade de você declarar as despesas 
com refeições como refeições de negócios? 
     
4 
Você deslocou-se ao estrangeiro para visitar familiares e ter uma breve reunião com um 
fornecedor. Independentemente disso, você pode declarar as suas despesas de hotel e 
refeições (para as quais convidou seus familiares) como despesas de representação. Qual a 
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probabilidade de você declarar suas despesas de hotel e refeições como despesas de 
representação? 
5 
Você participou, recentemente, em um projeto numa empresa do seu conhecimento. Tendo 
a possibilidade de ocultar o rendimento obtido na sua declaração de rendimento. Qual a 
probabilidade de você ocultar esse rendimento? 
     
 
 
B – Cumprimento Fiscal – Coercivo e Voluntário 
B1. Indique, para cada uma das seguintes afirmações, o seu grau de concordância. 5 = Concordo 
totalmente; 4 = Concordo; 3 = Não concordo nem discordo; 2 = Discordo; 1 = Discordo totalmente. 
 
Eu pago os meus impostos, tal como determina a lei, pois … 
  1 2 3 4 5 
1 São levadas a cabo muitas inspeções fiscais      
2 A AT efetua com frequência inspeções      
3 Eu sei que vou ser inspecionado      
4 As consequências da evasão e fraude fiscal são muito severas      
5 Eu não sei como fugir aos impostos sem chamar a atenção      
 
B2. Indique, para cada uma das seguintes afirmações, o seu grau de concordância. 5 = Concordo 
totalmente; 4 = Concordo; 3 = Não concordo nem discordo; 2 = Discordo; 1 = Discordo totalmente. 
 
Eu pago os meus impostos, tal como determina a lei, pois … 
  1 2 3 4 5 
1 É obvio para mim que é o que qualquer contribuinte faria      
2 Para apoiar o Estado e os outros cidadãos      
3 Eu gosto de contribuir para o bem-estar geral de todos      
4 Para mim é completamente natural      
5 Considero que seja o meu dever como cidadão      
 
C – Confiança 
 
C1. Pense na Autoridade Tributária e naquilo que esta tem feito ao longo dos últimos anos. Indique, para 
cada uma das seguintes afirmações, o seu grau de concordância. 5 = Concordo totalmente; 4 = Concordo; 
3 = Não concordo nem discordo; 2 = Discordo; 1 = Discordo totalmente. 
  1 2 3 4 5 
1 A AT tem apoiado os contribuintes      
2 A AT trata corretamente os contribuintes      
3 A AT é uma instituição confiável      
4 A AT é uma instituição fidedigna      
5 A AT trata os seus contribuintes num modo respeitável       
 
D – Avaliação do Sistema Fiscal 
 
D1. As seguintes afirmações referem-se à sua perceção do poder legítimo da Autoridade Tributária. 
Indique, para cada uma das seguintes afirmações, o seu grau de concordância. 5 = Concordo totalmente; 




  1 2 3 4 5 
1 A fraude fiscal é detetada numa percentagem elevada dos casos      
2 A AT combate os crimes fiscais de um modo eficaz      
3 A fraude fiscal é susceptível de ser detetada      
4 A AT controla frequentemente com detalhe os seus contribuintes      
5 
Devido ao seu conhecimento e competência, a AT é capaz de detectar quase todos os atos 
de fraude fiscal 
     
 
D2. As seguintes afirmações referem-se à sua perceção do poder coercivo da Autoridade Tributária. 
Indique, para cada uma das seguintes afirmações, o seu grau de concordância. 5 = Concordo totalmente; 
4 = Concordo; 3 = Não concordo nem discordo; 2 = Discordo; 1 = Discordo totalmente. 
  1 2 3 4 5 
1 A AT pretende, principalmente, punir      
2 A AT investiga até encontrar indícios de incumprimento fiscal      
3 As intervenções da AT, incluindo as inspeções tributárias, são muito severas       
4 A AT nutre sentimentos hostis em relação aos contribuintes      
5 A AT interpreta a legislação fiscal de modo a punir o maio número de contribuintes      
 
 
E - Dados Sociodemográficos 
 
E1. Sexo:  M •  F • 
 
E2. Idade: ________ 
 
E3. Tem formação universitária? Sim • Não • 
 
E4. Já teve alguma formação área fiscal? Sim • Não • 
 
E5. Vive em conjugalidade? Sim • Não • 
 
E6. Qual a sua condição perante o trabalho, trabalha? Sim • Não • 
 
E7. Na sua profissão principal é/era trabalhador por conta de outrem? Sim • Não • 
 
E8. Qual das seguintes descrições se aproxima mais do que sente relativamente ao rendimento atual das 
pessoas que vivem na sua habitação? 
1 O rendimento atual permite viver confortavelmente  
2 O rendimento atual dá para viver  
3 É difícil viver com o rendimento atual  
4 É muito difícil viver com o rendimento atual  
 
E9. Independentemente de pertencer a uma religião em particular, diria que é uma pessoa  
Nada religiosa •  Algo religiosa •  Muito religiosa •  Ateu • 
 
E10. Atualmente, sente que pertence a alguma religião? Sim • Não • 
 
 
 
